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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that
affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he would
never get time to plant any crops." 12 Considering that neither the
local agency in Idaho nor the regional office of the corporation in
Denver knew of the exclusion that rendered plaintiff's 1945 crop
uninsurable, it may well be that mere publication of these countless
'Regulations' [of Federal Administrative Agencies] is not enough to
call forth the doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse.13 To
date, 100,000 of these regulations have been published in the Fed-
eral Register; ". . . they are often overlapping, and sometimes con-
tradictory, and very often modify or repeal each other .... , 14
Though they have been placed in bound volumes, numbering forty-
seven since December, 1946, they have not been codified so as to
be as usable as the four volumes of the "United States Code" and
its supplement. The spirit of the dissent, therefore, presents an
equally strong and converse maxim or rule of law, namely, that,
"A law not properly published to the people is no law." 15
J. w. C.
PENAL LAw -ADVERTISING CONTESTS CONSTITUTING LOT-
TERIES.-The Pepsi-Cola Company of New York was engaged in an
advertising campaign in the form of "Treasure Top" contests. Con-
testants were required to complete the sentence, "Pepsi-Cola hits the
spot because . . . ." A bottle cap was to be submitted with each
entry. Cash prizes were to be awarded on the basis of aptness, orig-
inality and interest. Complainants are engaged in the business of
bottling, selling and distributing the soft drink known as Pepsi-Cola.
Defendants contended that the contest was a lottery and as such
against the public policy of the state as declared by the constitution
and by statute. From a decree denying a temporary injunction re-
straining defendants from interfering in any way with the carrying
on of the contest, complainants appeal. Held, decree reversed and
remanded, on the ground that the exercise of skill by contestants
removed it from the nature of a lottery. Minges v. City of Bir-
mingham, - Ala. -, 36 So. 2d 93 (S. Ct. Ala. 1948).
The three necessary elements of a lottery are the offering of a
prize, the awarding thereof by chance, and the giving of a considera-
tion for an opportunity to win the prize. All the essential elements
must be present to constitute the scheme a lottery.2 The elements
12 332 U. S. 380, 387, 92 L. ed. 51, 55 (1947).
13 Lavery, "The Federal Register"-Offlcial Publication for Administrative
Regulations, etc., 7 F. R. D. 625, 633 (1948).
14 Id. at 636.
is Id. at 634.
'ALA. CoNsT. § 65 (1901).
2 Grimes v. State, 235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73 (1937).
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RECENT DECISIONS
of prize and consideration being clearly present in the principal case,
the issue revolves around the presence of the element of chance as
that term is used in connection with lotteries. 3
In England and Canada where the "pure chance doctrine" pre-
vails, a contest is not a lottery even though the participants pay a
consideration for the chance to win a prize, unless the result depends
entirely upon chance.4  In the United States the rule was the same
until about 1904.5 It is now generally held that chance need be only
the dominant or controlling factor.6 The mere fact that some skill
is involved is insufficient to save a contest from condemnation as a
lottery.7  Thus various types of guessing contests are held to be lot-
teries in those jurisdictions which do not follow the "pure chance
doctrine." 8 Although the correct answer either does or will exist
and more or less skill and judgment could be exercised in approach-
ing the solution, the chance element remains controlling. In com-
petitions of this nature determining whether the chance factor is
dominant or subordinate is often a troublesome question.
Defendants in the principal case contend that the rules com-
municated to the contestants do not establish sufficiently definite
standards whereby one may intelligently exercise skill in preparing a
statement, and that it is mere chance whether a contestant prepares
a statement which will appeal to the taste or whim of the contest
judge. In rejecting this contention the court stated that the prep-
aration of such a statement or composition requires the exercise of
judgment, skill, discretion and effort on the part of a contestant. It
argued that some participants will exercise more skill, and put forth
more effort than others. It stated further that the selections were
to be made by the application of definitely known standards promul-
gated for that purpose. In Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, the
awarding of a prize for the "best" essay upon the name of a certain
breakfast food was held not to be a lottery.9 The defendant post-
master therein contended that the rules of the contest did not specify
3 "Chance as one of the elements of a lottery has reference to the attempt
to attain certain ends, not by skill or any known or fixed rules, but by the
happening of a subsequent event, incapable of ascertainment or accomplishment
by means of human foresight or ingenuity." See Note, 34 Am. Jur. Lotteries
§ 6 (1941).
4 Regina v. Jamieson, 7 Ont. Rep. 149; Regina v. Dodd, 4 Ont. Rep. 390
(guessing the number of beans in a glass jar held not to be a lottery).
GUnited States v. Rosenblum, 121 Fed. 180 (S. D. N. Y. 1903) (following
the pure chance doctrine).
' Waite v. Press Pub. Ass'n, 155 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 6th 1907); Public
Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092 (1904) ; People ex rel.
Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N. Y. 164, 71 N. E. 753 (1904).
7 Commonwealth v. Plessner, 295 Mass. 457, 4 N. E. 2d 241 (1936); State
ex Inf. McKittrick Atty. Gen. v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 341 Mo. 862,
110 S. W. 2d 705 (1937).
8 People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N. Y. 164 71 N. E. 753 (1904).
9 Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 5 9 (E. D. N. Y. 1910).
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in what respect the essays should be "best" and therefore left it open
to the whim of the judge or chance. The court ruled that sufficient
appeared in the record to show that the contest was to be judged on
the basis of literary merit for advertising purposes.10 In further
support of its ruling the court in the principal case cites Hoff v.
Daily Graphic, Inc., a New York case concerning a game involving
movie titles, wherein it was said, "The allegations in the complaint
clearly indicate the exercise of judgment and taste in the selection
of titles, both by the contestant and by the judges, and while taste
is to a certain extent individual, and perhaps at times fanciful, never-
theless the exercise of it is far removed from blind guesswork or
chance." 11
In those jurisdictions which have a lottery statute similar to the
one in New York ' 2 which does not provide that the distribution must
be by pure chance or by chance exclusively, but by chance, the de-
termination of the character of a contest as a lottery or not is gen-
erally held to depend on which is the dominating element. Com-
petitions in which skill or judgment is the predominant factor in
determining the winners will not be considered lotteries. The solu-
tion of the problem of which is the dominant element, skill or chance,
in borderline cases will vary with the jurisdiction.
K.R.
fORTS - ASSAULT AND BATTERY - NEGLIGENCE - PRACTICAL
JOKE-STATUTE OF LIMITATION.-Plaintiff instituted an action for
personal injuries resulting from "horse play" during a game of pitch
with the defendant and other friends. As the defendant stooped to
retrieve his money, he jokingly jerked the plaintiff's leg. Plaintiff's
chair was fitted with gliders, and since the linoleum was highly waxed,
the plaintiff fell over backwards, thereby injuring his back and suf-
fering partial disability. Plaintiff filed his petition one and one-half
years after the cause of action accrued. Nebraska statutes provided
for a one-year assault and battery statute of limitation,' and for a
four-year general tort statute of limitation.2  Defendant claimed the
10 Contra: People v. Rehm, 13 Cal. App. (Supp.) 2d 755, 57 P. 2d 238
(1936). Contest consisting of selecting titles for cartoons held to be a lottery.
"There is no standard by which one title can be said to be either 'best' or 'more
appropriate' than all others." State ex Inf. McKittrick Atty. Gen. v. Globe-
Democrat Pub. Co., 341 Mo. 862, 110 S. W. 2d 705 (1937).
11 Hoff v. Daily Graphic, Inc., 132 Misc. 597, 230 N. Y. Supp. 360 (Sup.
Ct. 1928). Contra: State ex Inf. McKittrick Atty. Gen. v. Globe-Democrat
Pub. Co., 341 Mo. 862, 110 S. W. 2d 715 (1937). The court therein states
that the Hoff case seems to be ruled on the English "pure chance" theory.
12 N. Y. PENAL CoDE §§ 1370-1386.
1Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208 (1943).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (1943).
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